BIDDLE v. HOOVEN.
In Biddle v. Hooven, 120 Pa. 22 1, it was decided that:
Section 7, Act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 369, providing:
"That in all cases where no payment, claim or demand shall
have been made on account of, or for any ground-rent, annuity or other charge upon real estate for twenty-one years, or
no declaration or acknowledgment of the existence, thereof
shall have been made within that period by the owner of the
premises, subject to such ground-rent, annuity or charge, a
release or extinguishment thereof shall be presumed, and
such ground rent, annuity or charge shall thereafter be irrecoverable," affecting the remedy merely, is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of a contact: Korn v.
Browne, 64 Pa. 55, limited.

This case has never been satisfactory to the profession.
The defendant bought the ground at a sheriff's sale.
Accepting a deed of sale reciting a contract for the payment
of the rent, and binding himself by the covenants running
with the land, he has taken upon himself to perform the contract, holding out to the world that he enjoys the land in consideration of payment to his landlord as expressed in Ingersoll
v. Sergeant, i Wharton, 337. He binds himself not only to
pay the rent at the times and in the manner in which it
should become due, but with a further expressed covenant as
to the method of extinguishment; the operation of this proviso is of the nature of a covenant to carry out a contract,
especially favored in Pennsylvania, as the courts have at various times declared. This contract the court described in
Ingersoll v. Sergeant as one of landlord and tenant yielding
rent service, and, therefore, ought to be governed by the rules
regulating rent service, which, in the absence of the statute of
Quia Emptores, import a tenure with fealty to pay the rent
forever, and is almost the first study placed in the hands of
the Pennsylvania student at law.
The mutual deed of the parties, executed in counterpart,
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imports a tenure. Although not a rent charge, the words of
the-grantee in the ground-rent deed, for the purpose of a contract, apart from tenure, would be considered as a confirmation from the tenant to the landlord of the rent in question ;
and this was admitted by Chief Justice Woodward, in Wallace
v. Harmstad, 8 Wright, 492, outside of any question of
tenure, that the tenant should perform his express covenant
under all circumstances. He has not just cause of complaint,
and can always protect himself, because it is in his power, and
it is his duty to pay, or cause to be paid, the rent reserved by
the grantor in the original deed.
As conclusively explained in Ingersoll v. Sergeant, page
353, the rent service being given by way of retribution to the
landlord for the land demised by him to the tenant, and the
obligation of the latter to pay the rent arising from his having
enjoyed the land under a contract with his landlord, it is reasonable that his obligation to pay should be regulated by the
extent of his enjoyment; and, therefore, it is that if he be
legally deprived of his enjoyment of part of the land demised,
he shall be released from the rent only in proportion to the
value of the land evicted. And in no case shall an eviction
of part of the demised premises, where the tenant continues
to enjoy the residue thereof, discharge him from the payment
of the whole rent, unless it be for the tortious act of the landlord himself, who shall forego all right to receive it in such
case, as long as he prevents the tenant against his will from
enjoying any part of the land.
The plaintiffs make no new argument, raise no extraordinary defense, but, as a matter of public policy, contend that
this inheritable estate shall be placed upon the same foundation as other estates, and that their contract shall be interpreted by the settled law of the land; and so this contract
between the ground-rent landlord and tenant, has always been
treated, as expressed in St.
avy's Church v.
iles, I
Wharton, 229.
There the court declared: " We have no statute barring
the right of an owner to an estate consisting of ground rent,
through his neglect to assert it, nor yet to preclude him from
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recovering the rent itself after any lapse of time. It is true
that statutes of limitations, embracing legal estates or legal
rights alone, have been extended and applied by courts of
equity to estates and rights of an equitable character, in order
to guard against evils attending the latter description of
estates and rights similar to those provided for in respect to
legal estates and legal rights by such statutes; but they have
never been extended, by either courts of law or equity, to
estates or rights purely legal, not considered as coming within
either the letter, spirit or meaning thereof, The ground rent,
then, in question, being an estate purely legal, and there being
no act or statute of limitation in force here which comprehends it, it follows that the courts have no authority to interpose a limitation that would bar the plaintiff of his right to
enjoy it. The exercise of such a power zvould not only seem
to be itrenching upon the legislative Province, but upozn the constitutionalright of the plaintiff, by depriving him of his estate
jprevious warning of his danger,
without having given him any
so as to enable him to guard against it. It is proper here to
bear in mind that it is the title or right of the plaintiff to the
rent as his freehold estate that we are considering, and not his
right to receive and enforce the payments of the back rents
which are the fruits of it, and which he alleges to be .due and
unpaid; because the rent after it has become payable is a
mere debt or chose in action which, from lapse of time, a jury
might presume has been paid in the absence of everything
tending to show the contrary; but still the existence of the
estate is not affected by such presumption, nor the right of
the owner, therefore, to demand and recover the subsequent
accruing rents. It is of the very essence of the estate here
that it should continue to exist according to its original limitation contained in the reservation creating it; and, accordingly, it must endure forever, unless destroyed or put an end
to by some positive act of the party having the power to do
so, or by act or operation of law. But why should the neglect of the owner of the rent to demand it, after it has become
payable for any given length of time, produce the same
effect? Such neglect cannot, in the least, interfere with the
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rights of the owner of the lot; nor prejudice him in any
way. He has a right to use and improve the lot if he please;
and this is all perfectly consistent with the duty that he owes to
the owner of the ground-rent. Their respective estates are distinct and susceptible of being fully enjoyed without conflict.
Ground rents seem to have been created in this State with a
view to promote the improvement of unimproved lands, by
affording the grantees the opportunity of employing theirmoney
in putting up dwellings and other houses thereon, instead of
giving it to the grantors in payment of what would have been
considered a fair price for the purchase of the fee simple in
the land, without any reservation of rent. The rent reserved
in such cases forms the only and whole consideration that is
to be paid for the land, and the grantee is bound to pay it
only as long as the title which he received from the grantor
proves sufficient to protect and secure him in enjoyment of
the land granted. Hence the right of the owner to the
ground rent seems to be founded in great equity as well as
justice, and ought not, therefore, to be regarded with any
disfavor. Such a thing as the extinguishment of a ground
rent by the owner thereof has seldom, perhaps never, happened without his executing a deed or instrument of writing
to that effect, which may be placed on record, and the owner
of the ground be thus protected forever after against the payment of the rent. There would seem, therefore, to be little
reason for presuming a release of the ground-rent merely from
the delay of the owner in demanding it. Such presumption,
if it were to be made, would doubtless be contrary to the
truth of the fact in every case, and would certainly work injustice to the owner of the ground rent. As long, therefore, as
the ground rent can be shown to have been created by a valid
deed, and the title thereto clearly be established in the party
claiming it, mere lapse of time ought not to be considered
sufficient to raise the presumption that it has been released."
This was affirmed in the case of MfcQuesney v. Hiester, 9
Casey, on the authority of the ruling in Sir William Foster's
Case, 8 Co. 129, where it was held the right to the rent was
evidenced by reservation by deed. In Lyons v. Adde, 63
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Barbour, (N. Y.) 89, the court held that the conveyances of
the Van Rensselaer manor lands were deeds of assignment
leaving no estate, reversion, or possibility of reverter in the
grantor, and not creating rents service; but they do create
rents charge, and, therefore, any release must be by deed,
especially when the grantees have accepted their conveyances,
which amounts to an implied covenant to pay, added to the
proof or admission that such rent has not been paid.
In Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Barr. 196, the court said that the
grantee of land in fee, out of which a rent is reserved in the
nature of a rent service by an indenture, is estopped denying
the title in the grantor to whom the rent was reserved, and
this was because of the existence of the tenure of landlord and
tenant.
In Cadwalade,"s Appeal, 31 P. F. Smith, 194, the case of a
lease for ten thousand years, the court said the statute of
limitations does not run against the landlord until the tenant
has terminated the relation by some judicial act clearly evidencing adverse possession; that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run in favor of one who had held in subservience to the title of another until the privity between them is
severed by some unequivocal act.
In Wood's Appeal, 6 Casey, 274, it was said the Act of
1849, in reference to the wages of miners, could n6t impair
the contracts between landlord and tenant. Again, in the
case of Hillcrman v. Ingersoll, 5 Phila. Rep. 143, the court,
Hare, J., said, in the case of a bond without payment or
acknowledgment for twenty years, there may be enough to
justify the belief that it has been paid, because the obligor is
in default as long as the condition is broken, and the obligee
may proceed at once to get his money; but with the groundrent there is this difference, the purpose is not that the principal shall be paid, but shall remain until the tenant sees fit to
pay it. The landlord cannot call in his money, and must
suffer it to stand until it is brought to his door. The grantee
of the land, subject to the ground rent, has covenanted to pay
the rents; it is his duty to pay, and the covenant excuses
demand, as was decided in Zngersoll v. ScriCaant, St. Jfiary's
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Churck v. Miles, Bosler v. Kuhn, 8 Watts & Sergeant, 183,
where, also, in all three cases, the court disposed of the comparison to a mortgage or other specialties.
When the law creates a duty or charge which the party is
disabled to perform without any default in him, and he has no
remedy, the law will excuse. This is the principle upon which
the tenant has been held to be discharged from payment in
certain cases of apportionment. But where the party by his
own contract creates a charge or duty of himself he is bound
to make it good, even in the case of any accident or inevitable
necessity, because he might have provided against it. On this
point it was decided that the tenant was bound to pay the rent,
though an army had entered and kept him out of possession,
because of the express agreement between the parties, and not
by act of law. So, in case of the destruction of the demised
premises by fire, it was well settled that he was bound to pay
the rent. This last example seems peculiarly in point here,
because, no doubt, one of the reasons for this ruling was that
the tenant should not gain from any negligence or mala fides
on his part.
In both of these cases the covenants amounted to an agreement between the parties, and there was no reason why the
lessor should suffer more than the lessee, since the lessee had
entire power over the land, and covenanted to pay the rent
under all circumstances. It is directly against the principles
of prescription, for, if he has had a quiet, uninterrupted posession, the presumption is that he has paid the rents, without
which he would not have been suffered to continue in such
enjoyment as set forth in the deed. The acquiescence on the
part of the ground-rent landlord presupposes payment of all
rents due.
As a general rule of law, nothing can be claimed against
that which owes its origin to matter of record, and this is to be
distinguished from the presumption of a lost grant or record,
which the jury may find from lapse of time and other circumstances ; that is to say, the deed itself wanting, the establishment of its existence is inferred from secondary evidence. In
the case of the extinguishment of a ground rent, it should be
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under claim of title adverse to the owner of the groundrent, with his knowledge and acquiescence, and the burden
of proof is on him claiming the adverse possession. It
ought to be noticed that, unlike the statute of limitations,
which merely affects the remedy by providing that no action
can be maintained after the lapse of a certain number of
years, the Act of April 27, 1855, goes further, and deprives
the owner of the ground-rent of his estate, and gives it
to another.
The Act of 32 Henry VIII., C. 2, extinguishing the remedy
of avowry for rent after a lapse of fifty years, was called a
statute of repose for the quieting of men's titles; but in the
case of a ground rent, unless the ground-tenant shows his own
compliance with the deed, he has no equity to demand the
quieting of his title. And how can the ground-rent landlord
be ousted and disseized when he rests under the declaration
in the deed that the tenant holds under him on payment of
the rents, on pain of forfeiture if he fails? Although quit-rents
were comprised under the Statute 32 Henry VIII., Coke says:
" The statute does not extend to a rent created by a deed,
nor to other reservation upon any particular es'tate, for in
the one case the deed is the title, and in the other the reservation."
The rent is the return for the enjoyment of the land, but
there is no disturbance of this enjoyment on the part of the
grantor ; the act is, therefore, in direct opposition to all reasons
for extinguishment. The fact that no re-entry has been made
in accordance with the proviso in the deed, is evidence to
-show that the rent was paid; while this act, instead of forcing
the grantee of the land subject to the rent to prove it had not
been paid, obliges the grantor of the rent to show that it has
been paid. Especially would this be at variance with established principles of law in Pennsylvania, where tenure exists at
least to the extent of fealty attached to rent service, of which
feudal burden to pay the rent reserved he could never divest
himself.
How could such an act apply to the quit-rents of the proprietary tenths or manors directly preserved to them by the
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Divesting Act of November 27, 1779 ?* In the English Law
there can be no prescription against an Act of Parliament as
the highest proof of matter of record. It has already been
seen in the Legal Tender Cases that Congress could not pass
laws changing the kind of money contracted for in groundrent deeds, though Strong J., in Skollenberger v. Brintoln, 2
P. F. Smith, 9, declared that the United States were not prohibited from passing any law imparing the obligation of
contracts, while this was denied to the States: Evans v.
Eaton, I Peters, C. C. R., 322. This was on the ground
that the parties had made the law for themselves,, and that
it was not for the public benefit to impair the obligation
of such contracts. It is true that the contracts are made
subject to the power of eminent domain, but no State, no
Government, can abrogate them to help an individual to avoid
duties he has deliberately imposed upon himself by his covenants in the deed. And in Dutton v. Pailaret,2 P. F. Smith,
113, the courts said the bargain must be presumed to rest
upon an adequate consideration, and neither judicial nor legislative power can pluck the fruit which belongs to one for the
mere purpose of giving it to another, even on the ground of
patriotic necessities.
In Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wallace, 603, see also Butler v.
Hor-dti, 7 Wallace, 258, a case of lease for ninety-nine years;
and McCabe v. Emerson, 6 Harris, I I I, all agreed that the
Legal Tender Acts did impair the obligation of contractsNo monarchy ever abolished tenures, quit-rents, and services
without compensation to the lords. To give this instrument
reserving a ground rent even the ordinary effect of a conveyance in fee, the words of a grantor must be taken most
strongly against the grantor as to the estate, and most
* In regard to the Divesting Act itself, Huston, in a note to his work
on Land Titles in Pennsylvania, said: "The old officers and friends of
that family complained of it much. I have heard Judge Tilghman call it
a high-handed measure; and once he said it was an instance that 'might
made right.' Shippen and Yeates, when it was quoted before them,
treated it as the law of the land, and a most important law, and said, as
the proprietary family had agreed to it and accepted the money, it was at
least useless for other people to make objections."
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strongly against the grantee as to the rents and services. The
right of eminent domain could not even be invoked in behalf
of apportionment where the property is taken for public use
by a railroad company. As when the states attempted to pass
stay laws, by which creditors were compelled to await the
payment of their just demands, and to receive paper money
representing to be of the value of specie, it was resolved in
national conclave that no State should emit bills of credit,
make anything but gold and silver coin legal tender in payment of debts, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. In most, if not all, the colonial grants before the
Revolution there was a reservation of quit-rent, not so much
with a view to derive any pecuniary benefit, as evidence of
tenure and acknowledgement. We have few instances where
such rents were demanded. On the contrary, it was usual to
insert the words "yielding and paying when demanded." The
Proprietaries of Pennsylvania only regularly rendered the two
beaver skins to the Seigniory of Windsor when they apprehended danger to their title, in the dispute with Lord Baltimore
as to the boundaries of the province. How much stronger,
then, is the case, when, in the ground-rent of Pennsylvania, as
it falls due, the tenant evidences his fealty by the deed, and
binds himself to a pecuniary benefit by his own covenant.
Chief Justice Woodward, in Wallace v. Harmstad, 8
Wright, 492, himself admitted that if our titles were feudal,
the tenant could not escape his obligation, even where the
deed was lost or destroyed. Apart from these arguments, the
injustice is that the landloid cannot now compel the tenant to
pay the principal of the ground rent, and since the Act of
185o he cannot threaten the tenant that the rent shall become
irredeemable, if not paid within any certain period. He must
wait until the tenant sees fit to pay it. He is not guilty of
laches, nor the tenant of default, and there does not seem to
be room for the presumption which might arise if the one
should fail to perform his part of the contract and the other
to insist upon performance. If there had been a release, it is
incumbent upon the grantee of the land subject to the rent to
place it upon record, and perpetuate the evidence. The Act
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of April 27, 1855, insists, upon the contrary, that the grantor
of the land should perpetuate the testimony. Even should
the tenant have gone on and regularly paid as the rents come
due, the owner of the rent is entirely at the mercy of the
tenant, and is in constant dread of forfeiture, unless the tenant
is honest enough to produce the evidence, which it is for his
advantage to conceal, and succeeds only by denying that he
has done that which, by his most solemn act, he has bound
himself to do; certainly, as the learned Judge, in Hillerman
v. Ingersoll, 5 Phila. Rep. 143, said, " reversing the natural
order of things." In covenant on a ground-rent deed, executed by the defendant, it was held that parol evidence was not
admissible, Buck v. Fisher, 4 Wharton, 516, to prove that the
lot formed part of a larger lot, which had been taken from the
plaintiff by A, and by an express agreement made between A
and the agent of the plaintiff, the lot was subdivided and
deeds to different portions made to persons named by A, and
among others to the defendant, with the understanding that
A was to pay the whole ground rent. The court added: "It
would be attended with an alarming degree of danger to
receive parol evidence in derogation of one of the most
solemn acts known to law." Yet this act proposes to allow
the tenant by parol evidence not only to impair his written
contract, but repudiate altogether that which stands before the
world like a judgment confessed, and especially protected by
the Constitution of Pennsylvania, declaring that even the right
of eminent domain cannot override without compensation. It
could hardly be contended that the annuity, which the testator
had charged upon lands for the support of his widow for life,
could be lost to the widow or remainder-man by evidence that
the owner of the land has avoided payment, nor could the
moral sense of the community stand the shock of the discussion whether the Legislature could authorize the owner of
land to extinguish such annuity on any terms whatever, yet it is
in the nature of a rent charge. If, at the very least, the act
releases the tenant from an action of debt, how can it relieve
him from an action on his covenant? In Frank v. Maguire,
6 Wright, 77, and Scott v. Lunt's Administrator, 3 Cranch C.
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C. R. 286, it was decided that the assignment of the tenant,
and the acceptance of rent from the assignee, did not release
the tenant from his covenant to pay the rent. He was bound
by his express covenant, unless specially released. In the
case of a ground rent to one for life, with remainder over,
should the remainder-man suffer for the default of the tenant
for life ? The reply that the law abhors stale demands, and
that a court of equity will aid against laches, cannot apply
here. Again, we presume the statute could not have a retroactive effect, unless a court should decide specially that it
could, under the proviso that this act shall not be in force
until three years from the date thereof.
If there could be any interference with the owner of the
land, or ariy injury to the public from the loss of improvements, or casting a burden upon the tenants, either unexpected
or oppressive, there might be some argument against an overindulgent landlord; but there is none; it is all for the benefit
of the tenant and the public, and the estate of the grantor of
the land is greatly favored in law and equity. " Cessante
.rationecessat ipse lez." From its very essence, then, justice
requires that it continue to exist in accordance with its original positive act of the party who. has the power to do so
upon compensation understood between themselves. It has
beenideclared that the Legislature could not divest the grantor
of his estate in an irredeemable ground rent, with all its provisions for taking his property under the guise of public use
with compensation, 17 P. F. Smith, 479; how, then, can it
divest him of his estate without compensation?
In Lyon v. Adde, 63 Barbour (N. Y.), 89, in discussing the
conveyances of the Van Rensselaer manor lands, the court
held that they were deeds of assignment, leaving no estate,
.reversion, or possibility of reverter in the grantor, and not
creating rents service; but they do create rents charge,
and therefore any release must be by deed, especially when
the grantees have accepted their conveyances subject to
the rent in the original conveyances, which amounts to an
implied covenant to pay, added to the proof or admission that
such rent has not been paid. In Pennsylvania the warranty
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in the ground-rent deed, especially warning the grantee that
paying the yearly rents as they become due, and performing
the services at the times therein mentioned, raises the presumption for the purpose of an argument that they have been
paid, and that the grantee is enjoying his estate in consequence of his duty in this behalf, with the further covenants
between them that should he pay the principal sum and the
arrears to the time of such payment, then the same shall forever thereafter cease and be extinguished, and the covenant
for payment thereof shall become void, etc. Can the legislature change all this?
In the case of Korn v. Browne, 14 P. F. Smith, 55, the

Supreme Court, however, held that the Act of April 27, 1855,
had a retrospective operation with regard to ground-rents, and
that as it did not take effect for three years, ample time was
given to all owners of ground-rents to make claims and
demands for the same, so as to prevent the bar of the statute.
"This prospective commencement makes the retrospective bar
not only reasonable, but strictly constitutional." The court
said: After a lapse of twenty years, bonds and other specialties, merchants' accounts, legacies, mortgages, judgments, and,
indeed, all evidence of debt excepted out of the statute, are
presumed to be paid.
The court will not encourage the
laches and indolence of parties, but will presume, after a
great length of time, some compensation or release to have
been made. The rule of presumption, when traced to its
foundation, is a rule of convenience and policy, the result of
a necessary regard to the peace and security of society."
The case of a mortgage we have shown is different; it is
only a security for the payment of a debt. If, as originally in
England, it was a conveyance of land absolutely, and only
could be rendered ineffectual by payment on or before the day,
the court would not then have so held. It was declared, in
Martin v. Sommerville, 3 Wallace, Jr., 2o6, that when the
Legislature passed an act for the relief of the creditors of a
manufacturing corporation, providing that certain persons
should be authorized to sell all property mortgaged for the
payment of bonds at public sale to the highest bidder, free
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from all encumbrances, and after paying certain expenses and
costs, should distribute the proceeds to the corporation
creditors according to the priorities of lien, such legislation
was unconstitutional by reason of impairing the obligation of
contracts between the mortgagor and mortgagees, and deprived
the mortgagees of a remedy which existed at the time the
contract was made. Here the ground-rent landlord has parted
with the land under the contract whereby the grantee grants
the rent in lieu of the land, under certain conditions, and
evidences it by record. The deed itself is the evidence,
and a release by deed is necessary in order to extinguish the
estate of the .ground-rent landlord. The covenants excuse
,demand. It is merely a pretence to say that the act was
intended to supply a defect in the law. It aids the owner of
the land, who has no right to be freed from what is virtually
the purchase money which should be paid, or proved to be
paid, by himself on his own terms. How can we say that the
Legislature applied the same rule of limitation in adverse
possession as to other real estate ? In the case of a tenancy
for years, the tenant would not be allowed to deny his landlord's title, which is in Pennsylvania a rent service; how much
less argument, then, where the largest measure of the estate
of each is distinct, accurately defined and described, and the
existence of tenure between landlord and tenant recognized, as
in the lease for years. Good faith and respect for his contract
binds a lessee to restore the possession; he could not even
show title in a third person, for he cannot change the nature
of his possession. The statute of limitation does not begin to
run as against the landlord until the tenant has terminated
the relation by some unequivocal act, clearly evidencing
adverse possession. This act does not make that unlawful
which was lawful before, but makes that lawful which was
unlawful, and deprives him of any defense. It has more than
once been held that there are certain principles of law qualifying all that falls from the lip of a judge in expounding the
common law, and all that is found in the statute book;
among them, that, where there is an express contract, a
man is answerable for any injury or mischief to another,
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even by the act of God: The River Wear Com. v. Adamnsot,
L. E. R. II. 508.
If the rights of the individual must yield to the general
welfare, his property can only be taken under the special provisions that no man's property shall be taken or applied to
public use without his consent, and without a just compensation being made. Whether a use is a public or private one is
a question for judicial determination, and it is the question
upon which the right of the legislature to interfere with private
property depends. All the cases concede this principle,
namely, that whether the use is public or private can only be
judicially determined; and cases in which the action of the
Legislature condemning or authorizing the condemnation of
property has been sustained are founded upon the concession
or adjudication that the use for which the property is taken is
in its nature public. It has been argued that the property of
a burial ground was used as a place of burial, and that -the
burial of the dead is a public benefit, and therefore the use is.
public, or in the public authorities, or in their control. But
the answer is, that the right of burial in these grounds is not
vested in the public, nor in the public authorities, nor subject
to their control, but only in the individual lot-owner. If the
fact that it is a benefit to the public that the dead should be
buried is sufficient to make a cemetery a public use, the Legislature might authorize A to take the land of B for a burial
place of A and his family. The fact that this land is taken
for the benefit of a number of individuals for division among'
themselves or their grantees, for their own use as a cemetery,
makes the case io stronger than if taken for the benefit of a
single individual.
As Chief Justice Woodward remarked, in Gault's Appeal,
9 Casey, 94, as to seizure and sale of land without notice:
"To divest ownership without personal notice and without
direct compensation is the instance in which a constitutional
government approaches most near to an unrestrained tyranny.
Whatever tends to modify this right is favorable to the citizen,
and ought to be liberally construed, on the principal that
remedial statutes are to be beneficially expounded."
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In Stuber's Case, 4 Casey, 199, the court, Lowrey, J., said:
"Rights vested by contracts are especially guarded and protected by the Constitution". Again, the court, in Palairet's
APPeal, i7 P. F. Smith, 485, said, decidedly, that an Act of
Assembly taking the property of one individual and giving it
to another.is in no sense constitutional.
In Coster v. Tide Water Company, 3 C. E. Green, 65, the
Chancellor of New Jersey said: " It is clear the Legislature
cannot grant an interest in, or charge upon, or a rent issuing
out of private property, to private persons for their own profit.
The public cannot go upon this property or use it, which is
the test of public use."
There is no adjudicated case where the Legislature ordered
the sale of estate of one man's land, when he was suijurisand
under no legal disability to act, for the benefit of another
person, also sui juris, and where such legislative decree was
sustained. It was not considered necessary to insert in the
Constitution a disabling clause, not only because the general
provision of the Bill of Rights was deemed sufficiently explicit,
but because no Legislature would be so regardless of right as
to attempt it. But it was deemed necessary to insert a special
provision in the Constitution to enable them to take private
property, even for public use, and upon compensation made.
True, the Legislature destroyed survivorship in joint tenancy,
Bantbaugit v. Bambaugh, I I Sergeant & Rawle, 191; but
the court expressly said the act deprived no man of his
property; where a title had already accrued by survivorship it
remained untouched. The only effect of the law was to place
the parties on an equal and sure footing, leaving nothing to
chance, without destroying, however, the right of making
any agreement between themselves which they might think
proper.
Norrisv. Clymer, 2 Barr, 285, was the case of a conversion. It
was there said that the Constitution allows every power which
it does not expressly prohibit; but taking the property of one
man to be given to another is expressly prohibited by limitation. In the case ofMengesv. Wertman, I Barr 219, there was
a moral obligation to convey, and the act merely gave effect.

BIDDLE V.

HOOVEN.

It is sought to evade these arguments by replying, as in
Sturgis v. Crowinshield,4 Wheaton, 193, that the remedy may
certainly be modified. It was also decided in Evans v. Hontgomery, 4 Watts & Sergeant, 220, that the Legislature can pass
laws limiting, modifying, and even taking away the -remedy;
but then the court added, where the provisions apply only to
future proceedings, there is not the least grotind for appealing
to constitutional restrictions on the power of the Legislature.
" If the parties to an agreement included in it the legal remedies by which the contract is to be enforced, a legislative
enactment changing the remedial process agreed on in regard
to that contract is as clearly unconstitutional as the attempt to
impair the obligation of any other contracts." But a statute
strictly remedial may impair the obligation of contracts; when
this happens, the statute is unconstitutional.
This always
happens when the remedy forms part of the contract, and
subsequent legislation conflicts with what they have expressed
in their agreement. The Legislature can no more overthrow
the lawful contracts of parties, under guise of remedial legisslation, than by direct assault. They can pass no law that
impairs the obligation of contracts.
The Act of February 26, 1869, P. L., page 3, is a supplement to the Act of April 27, 1855, which attempted to provide that under certain cases by the implied act of the
parties an apportionment might be presumed, because no
demand had been made for twenty-one years. In re
petition of J. A. Brown, 9 Phila. Rep. 548, the petition
was dismissed, with the remark from the court that it was
unnecessary to consider the question of unconstitutionality
of the act, because the case was not one which it was
intended to meet.
In re petition of Longstreth's Executors, the Act of April
28, 1868, P. L., 1147, providing, that in all cases in which
ground-rents have been or may be extinguished by payment
or by presumption of law, but no deed of extinguishment or
release thereof shall have been executed, the owner or owners
may apply by petition to the Court of Common Pleas for the
City and County of Philadelphia; that the said court may
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decree extinguishment, and a duly certified copy of such
decree may be recorded, etc.
The court granted the petition on the authority of Korn v.
Browne, sustaining the Act of April 27, 1855, 7 Phila. Rep.
46o. In Haine's Appea, 23 P. F. Smith, page 169, the same
case was reviewed. The counsel for appellant contended that
the act was unconstitutional, as it deprived the respondent of
his right to appeal to the jury, and usurps the judicial power
vested in the courts; and, further, that the act operated upon
the contract itself, impairing this obligation, in the violation of
the Constitution of the United States.
The court said decidedly that it was unconstitutional, and
that no case had been produced, "and we think none can be,
which goes the length which must be maintained here, that
wherever there is an outstanding claim or encumbrance upon
an estate, which is barred by reason of lapse of time, and,
therefore, cannot be enforced at law, but which, nevertheless,
is a cloud upon the title and prevents it from being marketable,
the possessor can invoke the aid of a court of equity to
remove the cloud and forever bar such claim or encumbrance
by a perpetual injunction.
" We assume, in this judgment, that the evidence brought
the case entirely within the purview of the Act of April 27,
1855. Upon that, however, we give no opinion."
Previously, the same court, in Palairet'sAppeal, 17 P. F.
Smith, 479, Sharswood, J., delivering the opinion, held, that
the Act of April 15, 1869, providing for the extinguishment
of irredeemable ground rents with compensation to the
owners, was unconstitutional and void. An act which
operates retrospectively to take what is by the existing law
the property of one man, and without his consent transfer it to
another, although with compensation, violates the Bill of
Rights.
"And if an Act of Assembly can deprive a man of his
property without a trial and judgment for even legal cause of
forfeiture, it may in like manner deprive him of his life or his
liberty, imprision him in a dungcon, or hang him without judge
or jury."
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In his dissenting opinion, Agnew, J., admitted that the act
:might be impugned as impairing the contract in a ground-rent
-deed, but contended that it did not really- deprive any man of
-his property, only by conversion substituted money for the
-estate in the land.
In the late discussion of Palairetv. Snyder, io Outerbridge,
-:27, as to the application of the act of April 22, 1850, to such
-deeds, where a perpetual rent is reserved, with a proviso that
the grantee, his heirs and assigns, should, within ten years
from the date thereof, pay to the grantor a capitalized sum
;nd the arrearages, then said rent should cease, it was held
that such a rent could not be redeemed after the period had
elapsed, as the Legislature did not make it clear that it was
intended to apply to that class of cases. It was urged, however,
by counsel for plaintiffs in error, that such an act would be
unconstitutional under Palairet'sAppeal.
Palairet'sAp.peal , then, and the final decision of the United
States Supreme Court, in the Legal Tender Cases, declaring
that the Government of the United states could not, even in a
struggle for existence, change the kind of money called for in
a contract, certainly overrule Korn v. Browne, upon which
alone the defendant in his suit relies, and leave the law as it
was with Ingersoll v. Sergeant and St. Mary's Church v. Miles.
However, the court, in Biddle v. Hooven, sustained Korn v.
Browne, to the extent that the act did not impair the contract
between the parties to the ground-rent deed, but said, further,
"we cannot give that case the full effect claimed for it."
Continuing, the court added that it was a settled legal principle that statutes which merely affect the remedy are not
unconstitutional, and that while the ground rent was forever
hereafter irrecoverable, the estate of the ground-rent landlord
was not impaired! The Christian Scientist can only succeed
with the hysterical or those who have imaginary ills.
Affect means to act upon, not to take away. Remedy
means redress. Redress means satisfaction for an injury.
Is it for one moment to be supposed that the estate in the
rent is not impaired, when the owner can no longer enjoy it?
Or does the court mean to say that only the past rents com-
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prised in the twenty-one years as choses in action cannot be
recovered, but those in the future can still be collected until
another twenty-one years have elapsed, and so on? This
-would seem an explanation if the court had not also said,
"we cannot see any reason-to declare the-act-unconstitutional.
"The act was not intended to destroy the hkan dlord's ownership in.the rent; it does not impair his title thereto; nor can
*it be said to impair the contract by which' the rent was reserved,
but upon the well-grounded reason of public policyit declares
that when the owner of such rent makes no claim, or demand
*therefor for twenty-one 'years it presumes it had been extinguished, which means nothing more than it ,has'been paid.
The language cited as before affects only the remedy; if it
meant more itwould be void for excess."
Yet, in this very case of Biddle v. Hoove.n, the. defendant
tenant asserted and maintained that, he had not paid 'the rent,
and claimed an extinguishment because he had not paid for
twenty-one years, repudiating his contradt, and' defying 'the
title of hislandlord in accordance with the 'provisions of the
Act of 1855 inhis behalf.
The court overruled Korn v. Browne to the extent that the
presumption of payment was not a 'legal 'presumption, but a
presumption of fact'liable 'to 1be .rebutted; the court decided
that the Legislature did not mean what it said, and cured the
evil by substituting'presumption of fact for legal presumption.
This iscertainly confession, begging of the'whole question,
and an assumption of power. For while the court might limit
the effect of an act, of the Legislature, it certainly' could not
entirely change the intent.
Had the court, in Biddle v. Hooven, simply affirmed the previous ruling in Korn v. Browne, there would be no difficulty;
the Act of 1855 would be clearly unconstitutional. Now,
however, who can tell what is the law on this question? The
array of authorities in Pennsylvania, and in all parts of the
United States, from the time that Daniel Webster defended the
charter of Dartmouth College to the Supreme Court of the
United States to-day, completely discredits the conclusions in
Biddle v. Hooven as well as Korn v. Browne.
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More than this, the court deciding this question is unable to
enter a decree quieting the title of the terre-tenant, and thus
enforce its own judgment.
In Haines Appeal, 23 P. F. Smith, 169, the court said, such
an act on the part of the Legislature would be unconstitutional,
and a court of equity could not aid the owner of the land by
perpetual injunction to remove the blot upon his title.
As to the sections of the act requiring the owner of the
rent to perpetuate the evidence of payment, is not the
recorded deed of the defendant's title, expressly stating that
he still holds the land, subject to the rent as expressed in the
original ground-rent deed, better evidence than a mere
receipt ?
The authorities are so overwhelming, the objections so
numerous, with points bristling on all sides, and the case so
clear, that the very clearness, the very simplicity, makes it
difficult to know where to attack first.
The only hope is that this question may again be argued to
let the court right itself, as was done by the United States
Supreme Court in the Legal Tender and Income Tax Cases.*
Richard M. Cadwalader.
*See cases in note to Biddle v. Hooven, reported 13 AtI. Rep. 927,
where it is held that the remedy might be changed, but the contract
could not be materially affected, or the remedy taken away entirely.
During the anti-rent agitation in New York in 1846, a convention met
to form anew Constitution. Though the feeling was with the anti-renters
against the Van Rensselaer rent, charge landlords, feudal tenures with
their incidents were abolished, "saving and excepting all rents, services
which have been heretofore at any time lawfully created."
A committee of the two houses of the Legislature, of which Samuel J.
Tilden was chairman, reported, among other things, against an act to
allow the tenant to dispute his landlords' title as unconstitutional and
against public policy.
A bill was prepared and certain provisions made to enable the tenant to
become a purchaser on the death of his landlord. The bill failed in the
Senate under the argument that the Constitution of the United States
declares that no State can pass an act impairing the obligation of contracts": 'The Anti-Rent Agitation in the State of New York," by
Edward P. Cheney, A. M. Publication of the University of Pennsylvania, pages 53 and 55.

